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The Theory of Interhybridity: Socio-political Dimensions and Migration 
Experiences of Post-communist Western Balkan States 
 
Armando Aliu 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Western Balkans integration within the EU has started a legal process which is the rejection of former 
communist legal/political approaches and the transformation of former communist institutions. Indeed, the EU 
agenda has brought vertical/horizontal integration and Europeanization of national institutions (i.e. shifting 
power to the EU institutions and international authorities). At this point, it is very crucial to emphasize the fact 
that the Western Balkans as a whole region has currently an image that includes characteristics of both the 
Soviet socialism and the European democracy. The EU foreign policies and enlargement strategy for Western 
Balkans have significant effects on four core factors (i.e. Schengen visa regulations, remittances, asylum and 
migration as an aggregate process). The convergence/divergence of EU member states’ priorities for migration 
policies regulate and even shape directly the migration dynamics in migrant sender countries. From this 
standpoint, the research explores how main migration factors are influenced by political and judicial factors 
such as; rule of law and democracy score, the economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil 
society score and citizenship rights in Western Balkan countries. The proposal of interhybridity explores how 
the hybridization of state and non-state actors within home and host countries can solve labor migration-related 
problems. The economical and sociopolitical labor-migration model of Basu (2009) is overlapping with the 
multidimensional empirical framework of interhybridity. Indisputably, hybrid model (i.e. collaboration state and 
non-state actors) has a catalyst role in terms of balancing social problems and civil society needs. 
Paradigmatically, it is better to perceive the hybrid model as a combination of communicative and strategic 
action that means the reciprocal recognition within the model is precondition for significant functionality. This 
will shape social and industrial relations with moral meanings of communication. 
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«Yet it is no exaggeration to say that liberation as an intellectual mission, born in the resistance and opposition to 
the confinements and ravages of imperialism, has now shifted from the settled, established, and domesticated 
dynamics of culture to its unhoused, decentered, and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the 
migrant,1 and whose consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile, the political figure between domains, 
between forms, between homes, and between languages1» 
 
                 --- Edward W. Said – Culture and Imperialism, 1993: 332 --- 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The EU started to shape a common migration policy with Maastricht Treaty which ensured a ground to 
structure intergovernmental cooperation. Afterwards, the Amsterdam Treaty put it a step further and included 
migration policies at the Union level (Community Pillar Title IV) and the Schengen Agreement into acquis 
communitaire. In Title V, the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) has transformed the intergovernmental cooperation to 
transgovernmental cooperation which covers the Union, member states and the third countries. Likewise, the 
TFEU has centralized the power at Union level for more effective migration policies and the centralization to 
Brussels has provided convergence and divergence in various migration issues.2 At national level, the EU 
respects all member states’ own constitutions and regulations because all member states have their 
sovereignty rights and some member states which suffer from high migration and asylum flows, are referring to 
their national law and regulations. Accordingly, the EU attaches considerable attention to the bilateral and 
multilateral relations/agreements (e.g. visa policy, cooperation with countries on illegal migration flows and 
back illegal migrant agreements). These relations and agreements are necessary and precondition for regional 
cooperation and enlargement policy. 
Thus the Western Balkans appears as a strategic region which has high priorities for regional cooperation 
and strategic partnership for the creation of the EU security cycle through becoming closer to these countries. 
Latterly, the EU has given many rights (i.e. visa liberalizations, social and cultural funds, financial aid and so 
forth) particularly to the Western Balkan countries. Approving Croatia as twenty-eighth EU member state, 
giving candidate status to Serbia, starting visa liberalization talks with Kosovo, helping Albania to achieve 
interparty agreement (government-opposition) and political stability and many other positive outcomes ought to 
be perceived as great successes of the EU efforts. 
From the perspective of free movement of persons and workers as fundamental rights which are 
guaranteed by the EU law, the Schengen regulations bring a paradox regarding migration and asylum issues. 
The judicial complaints, debates and skeptic attitudes in France, Italy, Germany and Spain against migration 
policies and Schengen regulations have illustrated this fact perfectly. In 2009, only these four countries have 
received approximately half of the total Schengen visas (4709491 visas, 49.02 per cent of total visas) in 
Schengen zone. With these facts in mind, for the Western Balkan countries visa liberalizations have provided 
overstay of migrants and asylum applications.  All Western Balkan countries’ (currently except Kosovo) citizens 
are allowed to enter any EU member state without a visa for maximum 90 days and 180 day in a year and they 
move to any member state within this process. Chronically, some matters of free movement lay on the 
circulation within the Schengen zone. To give an instance, immigrants who want to establish their lives with 
their families in France, are not allowed to use Italy as transit country through applying for international 
protection right. Generally, the Schengen states are sending back immigrants to the previous country from 
where they have entered (i.e. first asylum principle). Essentially, the study investigates the fundamental 
reasons through using empirical data and attempts to connect the main migration factors (e.g. visa, remittance, 
asylum and migration as an aggregate process) that are influenced by political and judicial factors such as; rule 
of law and democracy score, the economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil society score and 
citizenship rights in Western Balkans. In general, the research questions are as follows: 
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General Questions Form of Questioning 
1. Have the EU integration process and enlargement agenda significant 
effect on transformation of Industrial Relations and Post-Communist 
Institutions within Western Balkans? 
If yes Why? How?  
2. Have the characteristics of transformation process been shaped in 
between the Soviet Socialism and the European democracy? 
How? To what extend? 
3. Is the role of Constitutional Courts in Western Balkan states 
significant at enhancement of judicial independence and judicial review, 
level of democracy/democratization and rule of law? 
Why? To what extend?  
4. Can voice – entitlement nexus on the one hand, and legitimacy – 
effectiveness on the other be clarified in the context of industrial 
relations and democracy?3 
How? At which level: national, 
international and/or supranational? 
The research contributes at both the theoretical and empirical levels to the insights of employment 
relationship and comparative political analyses of Western Balkan countries. Specifically, it is important to ask; 
on the one hand how the Western Balkan countries ought to preserve characteristics of Soviet Socialism, and 
on the other, how these sovereign states will keep up doing reforms in political and judiciary area for meeting 
European standards and norms during the Europeanization and EU integration process without causing any 
damage toward the characteristics of Soviet Socialism. The research has focused on the Codebook of the 
Comparative Data Set (SPSS DATA 2006) for 28 Post-Communist Countries 1989 – 2006 (Klaus Armingeon, 
University of Berne), the Comparative Constitutional Project (University of Illinois) and the Judinst Project – 
Assessing Judicial Institutions and Judicial Performances in which I was an intern at Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg. According to the scope of these codebooks, 
research hypotheses and empirical techniques have been generated as below.4 
 
1. Elections 
H1 The date of election of national Parliament affects the percentage of votes. 
H2 The president’s term in office has significant effect on mode of electing the president. 
H3 The voter turnout in the parliamentary election influences percentage of votes. 
H4 The number of seats contested in each election affects the percentage of seats. 
H5 
The percentage of votes obtained by the winning candidate in presidential election influences  
the turnout for presidential election. 
2. Post-Communist Institutions 
H6 The political system significantly influences the mode of election of upper chamber. 
H7 The index of rigidity of constitution affects electoral system for the (lower chamber of the) Parliament. 
H8 The presidential power index has an effect on popular veto and veto point referendum. 
3. Women in Parliament 
H9 The number of women in Parliament affects the type of cabinet. 
4. Party System 
H10 The effective number of parties in Parliament has an influence on the type of cabinet. 
5. Complexion of Government 
H11 The complexion of government affects the percentage of seats. 
6. Democracy 
H12 
The democratization score significantly influences the electoral process, civil society, independent  
media and governance scores. 
H13 Rule of Law score has an effect on judicial framework and independence, and corruption scores. 
H14 The democracy score affects the national and local democratic governance scores. 
 
 
 
 
7. Industrial Relations 
H15 
The number of workers involved in labor conflicts has an effect on the unemployment as  
a percentage of the labor force. 
H16 The constitution has a significant effect on industrial relations. 
[PROVWORK] - Does the constitution mention a state duty to provide work/employment?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine  c. Not Applicable 
[REMUNER] - Does the constitution provide the right to just remuneration, fair or equal payment for work?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
[JOINTRDE] - Does the constitution provide for the right to form or to join trade unions?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
[STRIKE] - Does the constitution provide for a right to strike?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
[LEISURE] - Does the constitution provide for a right of rest and leisure? 
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
[SAFEWORK] - Does the constitution mention the right to safe/healthy working conditions?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
8. Judiciary 
H17 
Verdicts of constitutional courts have significant influence on judicial review and index of  
rigidity of constitution. 
Gallagher index of disproportionality
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The objectives of the research are listed as follows: comparing i) Elections, ii) Post-communist Institutions, iii) 
Women in Parliament, iv) Party System, v) Complexion of Government, vi) Democracy, vii) Industrial Relations 
and viii) Judiciary criteria in Western Balkan countries. The scope of the research in terms of criteria and 
factors are as such: i) Elections (e.g. date of election of national Parliament, voter turnout in the parliamentary 
election, number of seats contested in each election, electoral threshold, percentage of votes, percentage of 
seats, mode of electing the president, president’s term in office, date of election of president, turnout for 
presidential election, percentage of votes obtained by the winning candidate in presidential election), ii) Post-
communist Institutions (e.g. bicameral or unicameral parliament, subordinated upper chamber, mode of 
election of upper chamber, form of state organization as defined by constitution, judicial review, electoral 
system for the Parliament, type of cabinet, index of rigidity of constitution, required referendum, veto point 
referendum, popular veto, popular initiative and political system), iii) Women in Parliament (e.g. percentage  
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of women in Parliament, number of women in Parliament), iv) Party System (e.g. effective number of parties 
in Parliament, index of fractionalization of the party –system), v) Complexion of Government, vi) Democracy 
(e.g. year of acquisition of independence or official end of communist rule, overall status of a country, rating of 
Political Rights, rating of Civil Liberties, Democratization score, Rule of Law score, Economic Liberalization 
score, rating of press freedom scores, Corruption Perception Index, violent conflict inside the country or at the 
borders), vii) Industrial Relations (e.g. number of workers involved in labor conflicts, number of days not 
worked, unemployment as a percentage of the labor force) and viii) Judiciary (e.g. Constitutional 
Comparisons, Constitutional Court and Judicial Review). In this study, the hypotheses of Post-Communist 
Institutions and Democracy were merely taken into account because of the scope of the research. Thus the 
hypotheses of Elections, Women in Parliament, Party System, and Complexion of Government, Industrial 
Relations and Judicial framework were excluded. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND 
Why the Western Balkan countries were chosen for a comparison analysis? Geographically, the Western 
Balkans consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia. Croatia was excluded because of achieving a certain date (i.e. mid-2013) for being the twenty-eighth 
member state of the EU. All other Western Balkan states have put the full membership objective as ultimate 
achievement on their national agenda. Thus for the EU the most crucial point is the development process in 
these states and efforts for achieving EU standards. Of course, achieving EU standards is not possible with 
merely national capital and state development plans. The European capital flows and direct investments will 
enhance collaboration with state actors and philanthropic actions with civil society in Western Balkans. 
From international migration point of view, the Western Balkan case is sui generis. The European 
Commission has been published many analytical reports and strategy papers for particularly Western Balkan 
countries. Above all, from the European Union perspective, the Western Balkan region has a very high priority 
for pursuing the EU 2020 targets and enhancing the development process both internally in the EU and 
externally in Western Balkans. Agreeably, the distance among the EU and Western Balkans is a factor that 
distinguishes the region from other regions of the world. The EU considers the relationship with the region as 
both strategy and security cycle. Most of migration influxes to the EU come from the countries of this region 
and that’s why the hybrid model proposed is significant and it is supposed to be an effective strategy for the 
EU enlargement, integration, stability, and development processes. 
To support and improve hybrid model, the author has participated in various conferences in European 
Parliament and European Commission such as the conference of Mr. Andrew Rasbash, Head of Unit: 
Institutional building, TAIEX, TWINNING, that was entitled ‘The EU’s Enlargement Policy’ and the conference 
of Mr. Jordi Garcia Martinez, the Policy Officer – Visa Policy, which was entitled ‘The EU’s Asylum Policy’. The 
author has also participated in a conference which is entitled ‘Habermas und der Historische Materialismus.’ 
The conference was organized on 23-25/03/2012 and Emeritus Prof. Dr. Karl-Otto Apel (Universität Frankfurt 
am Main), Emeritus Prof. Dr. Jürgen Habermas (Universität Frankfurt am Main) and many other social 
scientists have participated as speakers and listeners at Bergische Universität Wuppertal in Germany. 
Altogether, the author has applied two cases i.e. Heidelberg Intercultural Center (Heidelberg Interkulturelles 
Zentrum) and ASAN - Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Studentëve Shqiptarë në Botë) to the 
research. The first case is testing the perception of a migrant receiver country (Germany) and the second case 
is testing the perception of migrant sender country (Albania). The author has carried out an in-depth interview 
with Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of the Foreigners’ & Migrants’ Council in Heidelberg 
(Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). The outcomes of the in-depth interview are very significant in terms of the EU 
integration and development processes and explain how hybrid structures just like the Heidelberg Intercultural 
Center and ASAN as hybrid cases are likely to be spread and networked in the future. 
Eventually, the information was mostly collected from the World Bank databases and the European 
Commission published reports in order to analyze each state separately and then compare the illustrations for 
finding out similarities and differences among each other.  
 
Systematically, the study presents the interrelationship among concepts and categories of comparison 
analyses of Western Balkan countries’ data. The first step of migration process is visa application. Many 
embassies of EU member states in Western Balkan countries have set up new regulations and procedures so 
that migrants or potential migrants in these regions cannot obtain a valid visa (long term visa) because of not 
meeting the eligibility criteria. The evaluation process of visa applications reflects the attitude of EU member 
states toward migrants and gives a clue regarding the degree of the usage of rigid and restrictive visa 
regulations and procedures. If migrants succeed to obtain a valid visa, then the second step is about the 
remittances. Even though the migrants declare how they will finance themselves in host countries during visa 
application process, many inconvenient matters may occur while they are in host countries or different 
problems may emerge in home countries. Thus inward and outward remittances are the inflexible dynamic 
factors which directly influence both migrants at host countries and their families at home countries or vice 
versa. The transfer of money amounts points out another issue which is obligatory partnership with private 
banks and institutions. Even public institutions at home countries may need to work with private institutions at 
host countries because of several reasons. One of these reasons is the protection of migrants who are living in 
between home and host countries. For instance, migrants who face financial problems actually are quasi-labor 
problems of both sides, i.e. home country and host country. Therefore, interhybridity proposes a solution that 
links home and host country with public and private actors, and migrants with civil society, and provides 
definite solutions for labor related issues. The third step is asylum that covers unqualified and low-skilled 
migrants. Generally, asylum seekers from Western Balkan countries temporarily find solutions for working and 
staying at host countries. The pushing factors at their home countries, the high level of competitiveness, 
restrictive migration and asylum policies at host countries are the essential points which force asylum 
applicants finding alternative solutions. However, these solutions sometimes turn out as illegal forms and 
damage the image of home country and make the host country change the positive attitude toward asylum 
seekers. In fact, the main reason of negative behaviors of asylum seekers is the lack of information sources. 
Altruistically, hybrid model will ensure various knowledge base online platforms for asylum seekers so that they 
will enhance the awareness of opportunities and advantages both at home and host countries. The fourth step 
is more related to international migration because migration as a category frames the influxes and dynamics 
from a broader perspective. With this respect, hybrid model will provide strategies, policies and more effective 
solutions for measurement of migration dynamics and creation of collaborations among state, private and civil 
society in terms of pursuing triple win solutions (home, host countries and migrants) via indirect centralization 
within public sphere and state’s authority to attain the ultimate achievement. This will be a reflection of global 
trends because on the one side, in the EU, there is a demand for legal migration of high skilled workers and 
well-educated students and on the other side there is an ideal type which is shaped by migrants of Western 
Balkan countries and symbolizes successes (i.e. achieving unimaginable). Profoundly, this combination will 
strengthen the partnership level among home and host countries and will provide some definite solutions for 
issues such as unemployment, pensions, bargaining, social dialogue, social protection and inclusion, 
healthcare, job creations, capacity building and so on. 
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Figure 1. A Range of Methodologies and Their Related Paradigms 
Source: Healy and Perry, 2000:121 
 
Positivism, Constructivism and Case Study Research were followed as paradigmatic research methods. The 
research has a mainstream methodology understanding that means the specifications of these three methods 
were partly engaged to the research. Positivism supports a quantitative methodology and generally utilizes a 
hypothesis approach, which is then tested empirically, as the ontological perspective dictates that objective 
enquiry provides a true and predictive knowledge of external reality.  The goal of positivism is scientific 
explanation whereas the purpose of social science is the “understanding of the meaning of social phenomena”. 
Constructivism, broadly conceived, is the thesis that knowledge cannot be a passive reflection of reality, but 
has to be more of an active construction by an agent.  Although this view has its roots in the ideas of Kant, the 
term was first coined by Piaget to denote the process whereby an individual constructs its view of the world. 
Case Study is an empirical inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context 
when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used.5 
 
3. DATA OVERVIEW: EMPIRICAL COMPARISON OF WESTERN BALKANS 
The outcomes of data comparison of Western Balkan countries are as follows: Serbia has the highest 
international migration stock and percentage of population. Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina follow Serbia with high level of migration stock. Noticeably, percentage of population of 
international migration stock of Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania are relatively high despite the fact that 
these countries have a low population rate comparing with Serbia. Symptomatically, the results of the 
comparison of percentage of population of the stock of immigrants, females as percentage of immigrants and 
percentage of population of the stock of immigrants of Western Balkan countries are as such: Montenegro has 
the highest percentage of population of the stock of immigrants and females as percentage of immigrants. 
Exclusively, Albania has the highest percentage of population of the stock of emigrants. Albania has the 
highest number of migrant stock at home country and Bosnia and Herzegovina has the highest number of 
migrant stock at host country. Comparing inward and outward remittance flows of the Western Balkan 
countries, the graphs illustrate dynamic trends. For example, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have high 
level of inward and outward remittance flows. Albania has the lowest level of outward remittance flows. 
 
The World Bank data comparison of refugee population by country or territory of asylum of Western Balkan 
countries indicates interesting results. Montenegro and Serbia have the highest refugee population, whereas 
Albania has the lowest refugee population by country or territory of asylum. The World Bank data comparison 
of refugee population by country or territory of origin of Western Balkan countries emphasizes the fact that the 
Western Balkan region has a very high level of refugee population by country or territory of origin. Particularly, 
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania have the highest refugee population level. Whereas Montenegro 
has the lowest refugee population by country or territory of origin. 
With respect to the illustrations above, researchers may recognize many similarities among Western 
Balkan countries when they especially focus on concepts such as inward and outward remittance flows, 
refugee population by country or territory of asylum, bilateral estimates of migrant stock data at home and host 
countries and so forth. The crucial point for generating a theoretical model in migration research is the 
generalization of concepts as categories. This may provide significant correlations among similarities and 
differences. 
Numerical results of Western Balkans are as such6: During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, 
Albanian net migration (total migration) numbers are as follows: -270245 (2000) -72243 (2005) and -47889 
(2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 523 refugees in 2000 to 76 
refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 6802 
refugees in 2000 to 14772 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock: 76695 
(2000) 2.5 per cent of population, 82668 (2005) 2.6 per cent of population and 89106 (2010) 2.8 per cent of 
population. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Macedonian net migration numbers are as 
such: -9000 (2000) -4000 (2005) and 2000 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has 
decreased from 9050 refugees in 2000 to 1398 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of 
territory of origin has increased from 2176 refugees in 2000 to 7889 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline 
at the international migration stock: 125665 (2000) 6.3 per cent of population and 129701 (2010) 6.3 per cent 
of population. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Montenegro net migration numbers are as 
follows: -32450 (2000), -20632 (2005) and -2508 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum 
has decreased from 24019 refugees in 2009 to 16364 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by 
country of territory of origin has increased from 2582 refugees in 2009 to 3246 refugees in 2010. There is also 
a decline at the international migration stock: 54583 (2005) 8.7 per cent of population and 42509 (2010) 6.7 
per cent of population. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Bosnia and Herzegovina net 
migration numbers are as such: 281795 (2000) 61825 (2005) and -10000 (2010). Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum has decreased from 38152 refugees in 2000 to 7016 refugees in 2010, and 
refugee population by country of territory of origin has decreased from 474981 refugees in 2000 to 63004 
refugees in 2010 as well. There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 96001 (2000) 2.6 per cent 
of population, 35141 (2005) 0.9 per cent of population, and 27780 (2010) 0.7 per cent of population. During 
2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Serbia net migration numbers are as follows: -147889 (2000) -
338544 (2005) and 0 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 484391 
refugees in 2000 to 73608 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has 
increased from 146748 refugees in 2000 to 183289 refugees in 2010. There is also a decline at the 
international migration stock: 856763 (2000) 11 per cent of population, 674612 (2005) 9 per cent of population 
and 525388 (2010) 7 per cent of population. Axiomatically, migration flows from Western Balkan to the EU 
have also economic consequences and dimensions. Incrementally, in Albania, there is an increase at both 
inward remittance flows and outward remittance flows. In 2003, the inward remittance flows is $889 million, 
and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $1.3 billion. Comparably, in 2003, the outward remittance 
flows is $4 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached $10 million. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $1749 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $2.2 
billion. Respectively, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is $20 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance 
flows reached $61 million. In Macedonia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $174 million, and in 2009 the 
inward remittance flows reached $401 million. 
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Rhythmically, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is $16 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance 
flows reached $26 million. In Serbia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $2.7 billion, and in 2009 the inward 
remittance flows reached $5.4 billion. However, there is a decline at outward remittance flows from $138 
million in 2008 to $91 million in 2009. Another economic consequence of migration flows is workers’ 
remittances: in 2009, Albania received $1.1 billion worth of remittances per year, Bosnia and Herzegovina $1.4 
billion, FYR Macedonia $260 million and Serbia $3.8 billion. 
Empirical results also illustrate another aspect of immigration from Western Balkan to the EU. Feminization 
of migration policies is very crucial because the empirical results highlight the fact that a high percentage of 
immigrants stock in 2010 is females. In Albania, 53.1 per cent, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 50.3 per cent, in 
Macedonia 58.3 per cent, in Montenegro 61.5 per cent and in Serbia 56.7 per cent of immigrants are females.  
Adhering to the data given above, from gender perspective, at national level states must regulate specific 
immigration regulations for protection of female immigrants and ensure fair and anti-discriminative solutions. At 
supranational level, the European Commission should amend immigration regulations with a guarantee of full 
protection of female migrants’ rights. No doubt, feminization of migration is an important factor for demographic 
change in the EU and might be a perfect solution for ageing population of the EU. Feminization of migration 
has also another significant effect on family reunifications and fits in the dialectics of triple win and hybrid 
model. 
 
Table 1. The EU Financial Allocations for Western Balkan Countries 
 
Western Balkan Countries Multiannual Indicative Financial Framework 
Albania (2011-2013) €228.82 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2011-2013) €328.7 
Kosovo (2011-2013) €212.4 
Macedonia (2011-2013) €320.3 
Montenegro (2011-2013) €104.9 
Serbia (2011-2013) €622.3 
Total Amount €1.81 billion 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on European Commission Dataset 
 
Comparably, the total amount of the EU financial allocations for Western Balkans is a bit higher when the 
allocations are considered at population base (Western Balkans total population: 18.66 million). To be sure, 
this evidence illustrates at which level the EU cogitates Western Balkans.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. THE GENESIS OF HYBRIDITY NOTION IN SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Sociologists argued hybridity as an indispensable collaboration and voluntary or strategic efforts of state, 
private actors and non-profit organizations. Anheier examined quasi-nongovernmental hybrid forms and the 
relation between the public sphere and the voluntary sector in Germany. He found out that the public sphere is 
institutionally embedded between state and society and located among the decentralized public sector and the 
centralizing tendencies in civic society.8 In this respect, the third sector which essentially has characteristics of 
heterogeneity and pluralism rather than homogeneity and isomorphism was argued for engagement in 
between public and private dichotomy. Accordingly, intermediary zone between the state and the market 
covers an ambivalent political atmosphere, a political economy of interest mediation and organizational 
sociology. Thus, hybridity as appeared in sociological research area, paradoxically, relied on confrontations 
with difficulties that occur among Government Organizations (GOs), Private Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs) 
and Private Market Organizations (PMOs). 
Hybridity lies behind the understanding of third way approach. ‘The Third Way’ was argued by many 
remarkable scientists, politicians and authors.9 The third way has various meanings such as ‘new 
progressivism’ for the American Democrats, ‘new labor’ for the Labor Party in Britain, a mainstream left or 
central left, a left-right rationalization, political environmentalism for Al Gore, the modernizing left or 
modernizing social democracy as Giddens-Blair concept, the structural pluralism in terms of the theory of 
structuration of Giddens. The distinction among the hybrid model and the third way idea is that the hybrid 
model seeks for approaching governance equilibrium in terms of the interest of state, economy and civil society 
from a broader perspective? Whereas, the third way idea looks more into political doctrines to create better 
political rhetoric for political actors of center left. Thus, the third way approach has disequilibrium between 
theory and practice. It explains how the ideal policies ought to be; however, in practice it is vague that to which 
issues it provides solutions in real terms. On the other hand, Jordan raised his critics of the third way through 
looking to international financial crisis and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and he considered the third way as 
failure because of being unsuccessful at regulating morality in economic and social relations. Jordan included 
the big ‘conservative’ society thesis which is a recent debate in UK to his analyses. As a contestation to the 
third way approach, big society idea is nothing more than an attempt to strengthen and encourage the position 
and active participation of churches and religious actors. Big society thesis reflects a decentralization process 
from central government to local governments and then enforces religious institutions at local level. The hybrid 
model that this study argues is something more than this picture. Ideally, hybridity looks into various 
communities, associations, unions and organizations to form an engaged and networked society. Indeed, it 
tries to shape a hybrid society, not a big society. Thus, this study frankly opposes big society thesis. Of course, 
the role and influence of churches at increasing tendencies and voluntary actions of societies are 
indispensable however not at adequate level for dealing with social issues. 
Giddens created a triangle which can be accepted in the context of general/real hybrid model, i.e. finance, 
manufacture and knowledge. He emphasized the fact that knowledge has become a driving force of 
productivity and expanding financial markets. Thus, he encourages governments to invest on strengthening 
foundations of knowledge base society. 
Habermas involved to hybridity debate however he strongly stressed the partnership with the leadership 
and central authority of state. He stated that the fundamental rights are effective for offering for participation 
with equal opportunity in the process of production and the interplay of a commercial society or a triple function 
of the fundamental rights is legitimized by the fact that in an industrially advanced society private autonomy 
can be maintained and assured only as the derivative of a total political organization.10 Naively, Habermas 
preferred to construct the relations between state and civil society from Marxist point of view and put forward 
argumentations that take into account the world’s multidimensional transformation process. 
With respect to this great transformation, multilateralism, regionalization and multipolarity caused emerging 
of new regional powers in the world. Monopoly powers are by inches oligopolized and this situation has 
balanced global powers because of the rising competitiveness level at both international and transnational 
level, and therefore the hybrids in various countries are proliferating. 
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Moreover, the economic power shift from the western countries to BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) and East Asia and Pacific countries has prepared a base for the rise of Hybrid Model. The rise of 
middle classes and Small-Medium-size Enterprises (SMEs) in these countries is a good evidence for effective 
hybridization via national private actors in modern nation states.11 Hybridity has various dimensions; such as 
political hybridity (e.g. hybridity in governance model), economic hybridity (e.g. hybridity in political economy), 
cultural hybridity (e.g. hybrid identities), judicial hybridity (e.g. hybridity in legal systems), environmental and 
social hybridity (e.g. ISO 14000 and ISO 26000), biological hybridity (Darwin’s hybridism approach) and so 
forth.12 
In the light of these considerations, supposedly, with creation of hybrid model within state structure at 
national level or within the EU structure at supranational level interhybridity as the main effect of controlling 
migration approach is possible because ideal hybrid types will work for the beneficiaries of both state and non-
state parts with taking into account ‘migration driving forces’ such as remittances, labor policy (wages, 
employment and so forth), economic and political motives, symmetric and asymmetric networks. The European 
Commission has created at implementing decision which supports a greater role for non-state actors through a 
partnership with societies, helping non-state actors develop their advocacy capacity, the ability to monitor 
reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes. The Commission has established a 
‘Civil Society Facility’ to provide funding for non-state actors. The objective of the Facility is to strengthen and 
promote the role of non-state actors in reforms and democratic transformations through increased participation 
in the fulfillment of Neighborhood Policy objectives. 
Considering clarifications above, interhybridity is not possible with using only hard law of states toward 
migrants. Conversely, using hard law for managing migration and asylum issues may cause an incline at illegal 
migration flows. It ought to be noted that preventing illegal migration covers alternative patterns that are in 
favor of migrants. The attempts to control the migration flows with hard law instruments may cause an increase 
in the number of illegal migration and cooperation of migrants with illegal networks. Interhybridity is an open 
debate for scholars. Castles argued that a general theory of migration is neither possible nor desirable. 
Hypothetically, researchers can make significant progress by re-embedding migration research in a more 
general understanding of contemporary society, and linking it to broader theories of social change across a 
range of social scientific disciplines.13 
Habermas argued that developing the idea of theory of society conceived with a practical intention. He 
proposed historical materialism which embraces the interrelationships of the theory’s own origins and 
application. He classified three aspects of the relation between theory and praxis: empirical, epistemological, 
and methodological aspects. Excellently, Habermas stated that: ‘Political theory cannot aim at instructing the 
state what it should be like, but rather instead how the state – the moral universal – should be known.’ 
Therefore, a convergence of the two systems on the middle ground of a controlled mass democracy within the 
welfare state is not to be excluded. 
In the light of theory and practice understanding, two examples can help us to measure how hybridity may 
work in EU, Western Balkan countries. The first example is a hybrid project in Heidelberg (Germany). The 
author of this article has carried out an in-depth interview with Mr Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of the 
Foreigners’ & Migrants’ Council in Heidelberg (Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). Heidelberg Intercultural Center 
(Heidelberg Interkulturelles Zentrum) is currently a general/real hybrid project which is a common platform for 
state, private and civil society. It has been established in April (2012) and the main purpose is to include other 
non-state actors to this platform in order to deal with migrants’ integration problems, society needs and many 
other issues which are waiting for immediate solutions. During the interview, Mr. Allimadi perfectly enlightened 
me regarding the passion of the people who work in Citizen Department (Bürgeramt) and volunteers who 
participate in the project from various institutions. The project likelihood has the potential to create a transition 
from general/real hybrid project to specific/ideal hybrid project. Mr. Allimadi shared with me the project’s motto 
that is ‘problems are potentials.’ 
 
 
This is a very crucial point because hybridity has state and non-state actors and each actor has its own 
problem. This means with coming together problems of some actors will be transformed as potentials or 
opportunities for other actors. This puts indirect centralization and social transformation in a consensus of 
hybrid platform together. Togetherness, openness and solidarity are three principles of this harmony. 
Idiomatically, Mr. Allimadi stated that ‘if you open your door to others, then you begin to live in a huge house 
(He referred to an African proverb).’ The author of this article is currently preparing a similar hybrid project for 
Western Balkan countries’ institutions for benchmarking, embedding and proliferating hybridity. The other 
hybrid project is ASAN Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Studentëve Shqiptarë në Botë). The aim of 
the ASAN project is to increase engagement and integration of Albanian young generation who live, study 
and/or work abroad. ASAN network will be a hybrid network of young people at home country and host 
country. ASAN project participants have created an online database (www.asan.al) and rapidly increased 
capacity of the network. Just like the Heidelberg Intercultural Center, ASAN project will deal with internal and 
external integration issues as well. Currently, ASAN project has a general/real hybrid model image, however 
increasing patriotism trend of Albanians, the willingness level and incline of participation level will shift this 
image to specific/ideal hybrid model. Namely, objectives of the project are listed as such: benefit from 
intellectual property and energy of young ethnic Albanians; take the future of Albania under control; creation 
and coordination of youth Albanian Lobbies; increase the influence of national Albanian identity; establish a 
national online database system; provide internships and job opportunities for Albanian migrants; increase 
Albanians’ representation in world affairs; unify state and non-state actors in a common platform; balance 
employment demand-supply of state and private sector; and unify Albanian youth with their diversities. 
 
5. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ANALYSES OF WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES 
Hans Kelsen (1955) investigated Socialist Law Legal System, Soviet Political Structures and various 
interpretations and approaches of the Socialist Law of State. These interpretations influenced the Western 
Balkan countries that were a part of Soviet Union.14 However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the legal 
superstructure and sovereignty of these states were overwhelmingly damaged. In this context, the research 
has examined how Democracy, European Industrial Relations and Post-Communist Institutions in Western 
Balkans have been transformed in frame of EU integration process and enlargement agenda. Undoubtedly, 
industrial relations and employment relationship (i.e. the relationship between employees, employee 
representatives, employers and nation-states) are very important factors. Especially, the Western Balkan 
countries were investigated in order to find out whether the EU integration process and EU Legal Structure 
(e.g. the Lisbon Treaty “TFEU” the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the acquis communautaire) for Western 
Balkans have significant effects on Balkan states’ transition to the European Social Model; such as, social 
dialogue, tripartite and bipartite information exchange and consultation, collective bargaining and legal 
provisions regarding employment conditions and social protection. In general, the research is in a tight manner 
bound on the criteria and factors of the Comparative Data Set (SPSS DATA 2006) for 28 Post-Communist 
Countries 1989 – 2006, is a collection of political and institutional data which has been assembled in the 
context of the research project “Forms of Government. A Comparative Data Set for 28 Eastern Countries” 
directed by Klaus Armingeon (University of Berne) and funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
 
Table 2. Constitutional Courts of Western Balkans 
 
Country Website 
The Constitutional Court of Albania 
(Gjykata Kushtetuese e Shqipërisë) 
http://www.gjk.gov.al/ 
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine) 
http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/ 
The Constitutional Court of Kosovo 
(Gjykata Kushtetuese e Kosovës) 
http://www.gjk-ks.org/?cid=2,1 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia 
(УСТАВЕН СУД НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА) 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.mk/domino/WEBS
UD.nsf 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Montenegro 
(Ustavni sud Crne Gore) 
http://www.ustavnisudcg.co.me/engleska/aktueln
ostie.htm 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia 
(Уставни суд Републике Србије) 
http://www.ustavni.sud.rs/page/home/en-GB 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
In essence, the role of the constitutional courts in Western Balkan states is very crucial because judicial 
independence of states and judicial review process reflect the impact of the Europeanization and 
harmonization process on legal structures, jurisdictions, democratization, rule of law and legalization in the 
context of constitutional courts’ verdicts. Constitutional amendments, constitutional reforms or even 
constitutional change imply that all of these transformation tools stated above are seen as attempts for seeking 
equilibrium among Soviet Socialism and European Democracy. 
 
6. APPROACHING A MULTIDIMENSIONAL EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERHYBRIDITY 
 
Many mathematical, economical, advanced empirical studies have influenced significantly the insights of 
migration.16 An economical and sociopolitical migration model is overlapping with the multidimensional 
empirical framework of interhybridity. In this context, the number of workers involved in labor conflicts has an 
effect on the unemployment as a percentage of the labor force (H15) and the constitution (must) have a 
significant effect on industrial relations (H16). The normative effect explains also the Hirschman’s voice-
entitlement nexus in terms of workers (skilled/unskilled – employed/unemployed) participation in labor market 
and legitimacy-effectiveness nexus in terms of workers representatives (trade unions/works councils – 
wage/bargaining). Thus considering democracy level and post-communist institutions in Western Balkans, 
SPSS data outputs illustrate rigorous results: reliability test of democracy criterion (∂=,922; Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin=,819) Barlett’s Test Approx. Chi-Square value is 315,262 and there are high correlations among Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties (Pearson Correlation=,927) Rule of Law and Democratization Score (Pearson 
Correlation=,913) Political Rights and Democratization Score (Pearson Correlation=,911) Civil Liberties and 
Democratization Score (Pearson Correlation=,848) Political Rights and Rule of Law Score (Pearson 
Correlation=,830) (for further interrelations of these results see appendix IV). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The economical and sociopolitical labor-migration model (Basu 2009): 
‘The economy starts with L native individuals, M migrants and a special resource, K = ∑     i which is the sum 
of individual holdings of resources. This resource is used for training a part of the native population (L) that is 
willing to join the skilled labor market (L1). The rest of the native population (L2) and M comprise the unskilled 
labor force’ or 
L2' = L2 + M 
The country produces a good Q using both skilled and unskilled labor L1 and L2'. 
The skilled and unskilled workers are q-complements in the sense that the marginal productivity of the skilled 
workers rises with the amount of the unskilled workers. In the skilled workers' market there is full employment 
(L1=E1), but in the unskilled workers' market there is unemployment, i.e., 
 
L1 = E1 
L2' = E2' + U2' 
where L2' is the total number of unskilled workers, and E2'(U2') is the number of employed/unemployed workers 
in the unskilled labor market. 
Q = Q(E1, E2') 
 
Each individual likes to consume goods and each native individual, i, in the economy has  
share of this special input where PK is the given price at which K can be marketed. 
The utility function is given by 
V = V(Q) 
 
‘The unemployment in the unskilled workers' market results from a wage higher than the market clearing wage 
in the unskilled labor market. This above-equilibrium wage is the result of bargaining between the unions and 
the employers. In their effort to maximize income from the labor market, unions propose a nominal wage W2 in 
the unskilled workers' market. In addition to the nominal wage for the unskilled workers, the unions also 
bargain for some additional nonwage benefits, the money value of which equals θ. This is a payment for 
training to acquire more skill. This is bargained because unions are aware that for the majority of the native 
unskilled workers, PKKi is too small to accommodate training cost.’ The employed unskilled native workers 
would now have 
PKKi + θ = ϕi 
 
to finance the training if they want to join the skilled workers' market (unskilled migrant workers don't have 
PKKi). For the employed native unskilled workers the cost of acquiring skill, Cs, (for a given PKKi) is dependent 
on ϕi and thus on θ; then 
 
 
 
 
‘The employed unskilled native workers would decide to join the skilled workers' market if the net discounted 
expected utility stream with a discount rate r(>0) is higher for that market. The discounted expected utility 
stream for an employed native unskilled worker is given by rV2=(W2+ PKKi)/P where P is the price level and rV2 
shows the return on assets in the unskilled native labor market, which is just equal to current utility. The 
discounted expected utility from the skilled labor market is given as rV1={(W1+ PKKi)/P−c(ϕ)} where c(ϕ) is the 
cost per period when C(ϕ) is distributed over the entire working period. A native worker would be indifferent 
between these two markets when V1=V2. So given the distribution of the capital resource, given W1 and the 
choices for W2 and θ, there will be an equilibrium level of ϕ i.e. ϕ~ for which V1=V2.’ The total number of 
participants/employed workers in the skilled workers' market is given by 
 
 
 
 
where is the proportion of native unskilled workers at a 
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given θ and would give the proportion of the native population willing to be in the skilled  
workers' market. If the union opts for a bigger θ, ϕi goes up and f(ϕ) moves downward or to the right and L2 
becomes smaller. Thus, the total number of workers in the unskilled native labor market given by 
L – E1 = L2 
 
 
goes down and 
L2 – E2 = U2 also goes down 
where E2(U2) is the employed (unemployed) native unskilled worker. The money value of the total amount 
negotiated by the unions for unskilled workers is written as 
 
 
 
‘Employers choose the level of employment, E2, once unions choose W2 and θ. The total amount bargained 
could have been just the nominal wage if the unions did not want to go for the benefits for acquiring more skill. 
For a chosen level of θ, W2 and a settled wage, W1, in the skilled workers' market, E2′ is determined such that 
W2=PQG2(E2′;E1,θ) and W1=PQG1(E2′(E1,W2,θ),E1) where PQ is the given price of the good. This follows from 
the assumption that the country is small enough to have any effect on prices. For the sake of simplicity it is 
also assumed that the immigrants have no effects on demand. Note that Gi,i=1,2 is the marginal product of the 
respective workers. Unions' bargaining usually involves both skilled and unskilled workers. They are concerned 
about the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in the economy, wages of both types of workers, the 
unemployment level in the unskilled labor market and the effects of migration on the labor market in general, 
especially on the unemployment rate. The unions are also aware of the distortion created by bargaining. For 
the purpose of this model, however, it is assumed that unions do not directly bargain for skilled workers' 
wages. It is generally believed that European unemployment is mainly a problem of the unskilled labor. In other 
words, since there is no threat of a huge supply of unemployed skilled workers to push the wage down in the 
skilled labor market, unions' bargaining about wages is focused on the unskilled workers' market. This 
argument stands in line with the fact that unions are less able to influence the skilled labor market outcome in 
Europe, although they take skilled labor's interest into consideration while bargaining for the unskilled workers. 
Thus with existing migrants, the labor market in the economy can be described as follows.’ The total population  
 
 
where L is the total supply of native workers, M is the number of migrants in the total population, E1 is the 
number of skilled workers L2′ is the total (native and migrant) number of unskilled workers E2′ is the total (native 
and migrant) number of employed unskilled workers U2′ is the total number (native and migrant) of 
unemployed, E2 is the number of employed unskilled native workers, where EM is the number of employed 
unskilled migrants, U2 is the unemployed native workers and UM is the unemployed migrant workers. The 
employment share of each type of unskilled workers is assumed to be determined by their respective sizes in 
the total unskilled labor force;  
i.e.  is the employment share of native unskilled workers and γE2′ is the number of employed 
native unskilled workers. 
M = EM + UM 
With information about how the unskilled workers decide to join a particular labor market, the union will choose 
a particular combination of W2 and θ to maximize the total earned income (wage and nonwage). The effect of 
the choice of W2 and θ can be derived from the first order condition of unions' income maximization behavior.  
 
 
 
 
Unions, interested in the maximization of total labor market income for native workers, will maximize 
 
 
 
with respect to W2 and θ subject to the constraints 
 
 
 
where λ  the weight attached to skilled workers' market in union decision making; τ1  tax on skilled workers' 
income; τ2  tax on unskilled workers' income; γ  proportion of native workers in total unskilled workers and also 
this proportion of total employed unskilled workers is native; b  unemployment benefit and α  weight for the 
unemployment of natives in union decision making. 
‘The first term presents the wage bill from the skilled workers' market. The wage bill of the unskilled resident 
workers' market is presented by the second term. And the third term shows that the national union is likely to 
internalize the effects of union's action on the level of unemployment of the native unskilled workers. Note that 
although unions are not bargaining for the skilled workers, they may take skilled workers' economic condition 
into consideration.’  
First order conditions are presented by 
 
 
 
 
‘Thus, to summarize, equations above solve for unknownsW2, θ, ϕ, W2¯, Cs, E1, L1, L2, E2, E2′, V, EM, L2′, U2′, 
U2, UM, Q, γ and YL given L, M, L–, K, PQ, PK, W1, λ, τ1, τ2, b, and α. It is assumed that i) this is a small country 
with given prices, ii) immigrants have no impact on demand, iii) skilled and unskilled workers are q-
complements (the latter raises the productivity of the skilled workers), iv) unions don't bargain for skilled 
workers' wage but they take into consideration skilled/unskilled labor ratio, unemployment and non-wage 
benefit, v) skilled market has full employment and unskilled market has unemployment because the bargained 
wage is greater than the market equilibrium wage., vi) all skilled workers are natives. Migrants don't bring any 
capital with them to be trained and vii) migration is caused by expected wage difference. The optimal 
combination of W2 and θ will be the one where the marginal gain from W2 equals the marginal gain from θ. For 
an interior solution, skilled workers will earn more than unskilled workers and unskilled workers will feel better 
being employed than unemployed; b≤(1−τ2)W2≤(1−τ1)W1. The weights, λ, α, taxes, τ1, τ2, and technology will 
decide whether the wage should be chosen on the elastic or the inelastic part (the second order condition is 
verified. After unions fix W2– (=W2+θ), employers decide on the employment level. Thus W2 and θ enter as 
arguments in the E2′ function. Since the productivity of E1 increases with the size of E2′, the size of E1 becomes 
a deciding factor in the demand for unskilled workers. Thus θ affects E2′ both directly and indirectly.’ 
 
 
 
Keeping W2 constant 
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‘The first term is the usual effect of an increase in the cost of hiring workers. This will have a negative 
impact, reducing the demand for unskilled workers. The non-wage benefit θ (skill training cost) actually helps 
workers move to the skilled workers' market. The second term shows the increase in demand for E2′ because 
vacancies will be created when a number of unskilled workers move to the skilled labor market. When the 
number of skilled workers increases, to maintain the productivity of the skilled workers at the previous level 
(i.e., dW1=0) there will be an additional demand for unskilled workers (because E1 and E2′ are q-complements). 
This positive effect is shown by the third term. The last two terms thus generate favorable effects for 
employment of unskilled workers. If the elasticity of the marginal product of the unskilled labor curve is not very 
high, as a result of an upward change in θ the employment of unskilled workers will go up i.e., ∂ E2′ / ∂ θ > 0.  
If unions are interested only in the employed unskilled native workers' market (i.e., λ=α=0) and want to raise 
wage, the absolute value of the elasticity of demand for labor will have to be bigger than one to support a 
positive unemployment benefit (i.e., since b has to be positive to be meaningful, it can only be supported by 
e>1). The existence of high unemployment benefit encourages unions to choose a wage on the elastic part of 
labor demand curve and thus wages and unemployment will be higher, higher is the unemployment benefit. 
Any increase in non-wage benefits will on the other hand have a positive effect on the wage bill (because of 
the favorable effects on dE2′), provided the elasticity of demand for unskilled labor is not very high. It is 
important to note that the negative effect on employment from higher wage demand may be offset by the 
positive employment effect from higher non-wage benefits. This stands in contrast to other analyses in the 
literature where any higher wage demand increases unemployment. In those analyses, if unions are concerned 
about unemployment, the negotiated wage will be driven to a relatively inelastic part of the labor demand curve 
compared to the situation when unions are not concerned about unemployment (i.e., α=0). In this analysis 
even when unions are concerned about unemployment they can bargain for an increase in wages and still can 
generate a favorable employment effect for native unskilled workers through their choice of θ. However, 
practicing restraints on increased money wage demands will be an additional tool to deal with unemployment. 
In the case when unions deal only with wage compensation, i.e., W2, they will be eager to lower wage benefits 
if they are interested in all three parts (skilled workers' market, unskilled workers' market, and unemployment 
pool) of the labor market but the labor demand is elastic and skilled and unskilled workers are complements. 
The model under the same scenario (i.e., labor demand is elastic and skilled and unskilled workers are 
complement and unions pays attention to the skilled wage bill, unskilled wage bill and unemployment) unions 
can afford not to change the wage demand at all or to change the money wage by a small amount and go for a 
higher non-wage benefit to maximize the total labor market income. However, to take better care of 
unemployment pool and/or skilled labor market, unions will prefer to be on the relatively inelastic part of the 
labor demand curve or to reduce the money wage. Migration is caused by the expected wage (actual wage 
times the probability of employment) difference. A vast majority of the immigrants to western European 
countries are unskilled workers. Thus they affect the unskilled native workers' market directly. The quantity of 
immigrants is decided by the government control or quota of immigration. In this section we will find out how 
immigration affects the equilibrium solution. Following immigration γ goes down. As a result, the marginal gain 
from both W2 and θ decline. The relative gain or loss will depend on the existing elasticity of labor demand. 
This suggests that in their negotiation, the labor union may choose a different combination of W2 and θ 
following migration. They may not change the nominal wage at all; instead unions may try for a reasonable 
increase in the training cost benefits. It was shown in the previous section that when more unskilled employed 
workers opt for training, the total number of skilled workers goes up. This has two-fold effects on the unskilled 
labor market: i) it directly creates vacancies in the unskilled labor market; and ii) the newly trained skilled 
workers need unskilled workers to boost up the productivity in the skilled workers' market (indirect effect). Also 
there will be direct negative effects from raising θ. However, the direct and indirect effects together raise the 
employment of unskilled workers by offsetting the negative effect. Consequently, unemployment goes own. By 
totally differentiating the first order conditions we see that dθ / dM will be positive and dW2 / dM may take either 
positive or negative depending on the values of the second derivatives or the rates at which the change in 
employment is affected by changes in θ and W2 However, dW2 / dM<dθ / dM. The effects of a reduced γ 
following immigration will lead to a new combination of W2 and θ where favorable effect of increasing θ offsets 
other unfavorable effects.’ 
 
These effects are shown in Propositions 1–4 where immigrants do not bring capital with them. 
Proposition 1: An increase in immigration increases the size of the skilled labor market. 
Proposition 2: An increase in immigration reduces unemployment of native workers. 
Proposition 3: An increase in immigration increases the skill composition of the labor market for the native 
workers. 
Proposition 4: An increase in immigration increases national income and native workers' share in the national 
income. 
Proposition 1′: An increase in immigration will increase the size of the skilled workers' market. 
Proposition 2′: An increase in immigration will decrease the size of the unskilled workers' market. 
Proposition 3′: An increase in immigration will increase the skill composition of the labor force. 
 
‘Consequently, unions may not want to increase θ.  Does this provision of non-wage benefit give any new 
insights in dealing with the problems of unemployment that is exacerbated by immigration influx? In analyzing 
unions' response to immigration, many Scholars have shown that unions' reaction depends on whether unions 
are interested in only native unskilled workers' market (pure wage bill maximization for native unskilled 
workers) or in unskilled workers' market as a whole (including unemployment of unskilled migrant workers) or 
in both skilled and unskilled workers' market. In their analysis for pure wage bill maximization (i.e., only in 
employed unskilled native workers' market), unions will have to be on that part of the demand curve where the 
value of the elasticity of the labor demand curve is greater than one. In other two cases (i.e. when unions pay 
attention to unemployment or to the skilled workers' market), unions might prefer to be on relatively inelastic 
part. Since bargaining over money wages is not the only choice, unions may accomplish their objective on any 
part of the labor demand curve by negotiating only for non-money wage benefits and keeping the money wage 
fixed. Of course, employment will increase more if labor demand is relatively inelastic. Thus, the introduction of 
the non-wage benefit brings in an element of flexibility that may benefit unions, employers and the government. 
The analysis suggests that as a result of migration when the marginal gain from bargaining for money wage 
goes down, unions have the option of switching their effort to change the non-wage benefit. In fact, irrespective 
of (assumptions about)whether unions want to focus on only unskilled labor market or on both skilled and 
unskilled labor market, the negotiation about non-wage benefit will have a positive effect. For the purpose of 
maximizing the total wage bill, it is better if we allow the unions to include all three parts of the labor market 
(skilled labor market, unskilled labor market unskilled unemployed labor pool).’ 
‘In European Union countries, the governments cannot affect the wages or employment levels directly 
because of the institutional factors. Unions and the employers decide on the wages and employment levels 
through bargaining. The governments are engaged in transfer payment through taxation and unemployment 
benefits. Thus, the government can only control the factors that indirectly affect unions' and employers' 
decisions. In a situation when migration act as a ‘competitive fringe’ in the sense that as a result of migration, 
unions follows a wage restraints policy, the governments (especially the left-wing governments who don't want 
to use anti-union policy openly) can use migration as a hidden ‘anti-union’ policy. However, in the model where 
unions can use non-wage benefits, migration does not need to be used as an anti-union policy. The 
government can change the anti-migration or anti-union environment by encouraging bargaining about non-
wage benefits. Noticing that unions' policy has a favorable impact on unemployment, the government might 
come up with some incentives for the employers to settle for a higher θ than what the employers would have 
agreed to otherwise. Employers also might feel encouraged if they don't need to provide for additional wage 
compensation. 
 
 
                                                          
 Please see Basu 2009 for the proofs and the formula. 
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The government can afford to do this because the total government expenditure on transfer payment goes 
down and tax revenue increases as employment increases following a successful bargaining for a higher θ. In 
that case, the bargaining power of the unions is not weakened in the presence of immigration influx.’ 
The government's budget is given by  
 
 
when B = total budget and immigrants can't join the skilled workers' market. Immigration of unskilled workers 
can affect B if immigration has any effects on or wages. 
 
 
 
where M = total number of migrants. If unions decide not to change wage benefit at all i.e., (dW2 / dM) = 0, as 
long as the effect of the first and the second terms exceeds that of the last term in this equation, the 
government will not resort to any antiunion policy. If both wages and non-wage benefits are changed, the first 
three terms need to exceed the last term for the government not to use any anti-union policy. However, if  
 
 
 
 
(on the highly elastic part of the labor demand curve where migration would act as a competitive fringe) the 
government's migration policy may reflect an anti-union agenda. Immigration, unemployment and their 
interrelation not only challenge the labor market of European Union, but they also demand attention for a better 
performance of the Union economy as a whole. The common perception is that the immigration makes the 
unemployment situation worse for the native workers. Scholars have argued that the presence of dominant 
labor unions together with immigration makes European unemployment problem worse than that in the US. 
Since migration can only be controlled by the government, it (especially the left-wing government) can use 
immigration as a covert anti-union policy when immigration acts as a competitive fringe. The analysis offers an 
alternative to that covert antiunion policy. It shows that it is possible to empower unions with an effective 
alternative by allowing them to bargain for non-wage benefits together with wage benefits. These non-wage 
benefits are expected to have favorable effects on unemployment, the skill level of the labor force, and the 
national income. Instead of using politically unfavorable tax or welfare program, the government actually can 
use these redistribution tools to encourage both the employers and the unions to use ‘non-wage benefits’ 
effectively in their bargaining strategy. That will help in avoiding an anti-union or anti-immigration environment.  
 
7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Dealing with international migration in the age of migration requires concrete solutions and alternative patterns. 
Hegel’s dialectic method might be applied to international migration for achieving syntheses and better 
outcomes. For instance, Hegel concluded that ‘all that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real.’17 As a 
rational, real and ideal pattern, hybrid model may help to control illegal migration with a proactive vision and 
transform mala fide migration to bona fide migration form. Interhybridity and indirect centralization will create 
more efficient and accurate policies and strategies, however for convergence among EU member states, 
hybrid structures ought to be created at EU supranational level with vertical relations. With indirect 
centralization within the confine of state’s control mechanism, authority and public sphere, these structures will 
have same legitimacy and effectiveness at the EU supranational level, and thus EU may improve its common 
migration and asylum policies in this way. Furthermore, empirical findings of the research have alarmed for the 
need of moral consciousness in migration turbulence through interhybridity mechanisms and good migration 
governance within the framework of hybrid model. 
 
The rise of forced migration and pushing factors prepared a ground for researchers to improve migrant-
based approach with collection of migrants’ narratives. Empirical results are not just simple numbers, thus 
these should be investigated with migrants’ narratives analyses. 
Narratives of migrants in Western Balkan countries are lessons and recommendations for all migrants in 
the world. Openly, hybrid model is a platform in which people share their experiences, and therefore hybridity 
is likely to increase equal opportunity and active participation, enhance engagement of migrants to diaspora 
events and ethnic enclaves, maximize benefits and minimize negative effects, and enhance the humane of 
migration from a holistic perspective. Hybrid model will enhance communicative action among home, transit 
and host countries and develop mechanisms for these countries to facilitate the exchange of information, 
create ground for networking and ensure a communication platform. 
The role of the EU is to help Western Balkan countries to keep up realizing reforms in various areas. The 
Western Balkan counties’ migration flows to the EU can be decreased with the European Union stabilization 
and integration reforms, enlargement and neighborhood policy and the Stabilization Association Process. 
These reciprocal communication will balance the European Union relations with BRICs and eastern countries 
which have multi-dimensional (economic, politic, religious etc.) nexus with Western Balkan countries. 
Obviously, it can be claimed that partnership and solidarity with Western Balkan countries have significant 
influences for attainment of the EU 2020 targets and hence integration and stabilization of Western Balkan 
countries within the EU will be a driving force for the EU. 
With respect to EU 2020 targets, high skilled workers of these countries are seen as potentials or 
opportunities, whereas asylum seekers of these countries are seen as threats or potential problems. Therefore, 
the European Commission is working on how to attract high skilled labor migrants in order to balance the need 
of 20 million high skilled workers over next years. Both two hybrid case – i.e. the Heidelberg Intercultural 
Center and ASAN – are strategic models for European Commission to support such projects in order to attract 
high skilled labor migrants and improve employment policies. The convergence of the EU member states’ 
national interests is needed in order to increase the effectiveness of a common EU migration policy. Hopefully, 
non-state actors are ensuring various scientific routes for solving migration issues in different alternatives. The 
involvement of non-state actors to hybrid model will support capacity building and active networking. 
Moralization of migration matters is possible with creating hybrid structures and hybrid forms can provide 
definite solutions in various aspects and interhybridity can transform socially the migration process in favor of 
migrants and society as well as state and non-state actors. Dreaming a world without migrants in the age of 
migration is an utopia (or absolute spirit), however dreaming a world with engaged migrants within societies 
with minimum problems is not only rational but also real. 
To sum up, it is assumed that embedded-hybridity in migration research better can work in post-soviet bloc 
Western Balkan countries. The specific reasons for this are twofold. First, from governance perspective, the 
role of states and the existence of centralized power at the institutional structures of these states still exist. 
Second, people living in the Western Balkans have hybrid identities and are more likely to be included in 
communicative action. Migrants with hybrid identities will protect their culture, national interests and values 
toward inhumanistic post-modern threats instead of serving as actors with dualistic interests in post-colonial 
era. Therefore, hybrid model is an effective strategy for social transformation of interhybridity. 
A list of impact factors and interrelated segments of interhybridity theory is specified as below: 
 Public Sector – Private Sector – Civil Society triangle (hybridity) has a significant effect on indirect 
centralization and enhancement of the state’s authority.  
 Public Sector – Private Sector – Civil Society triangle balances the public and private sphere 
dichotomy effectively.  
 Hybridity has a significant influence on political atmosphere, a political economy of interest mediation 
and organizational sociology.  
 Hybridity has a positive impact on the strategic operations of voluntary sector and non-profit 
organizations. 
 Hybridity affects the heterogeneity and pluralism level of state and non-state actors and provides that 
states are embedded with non-state actors in actor constellations in equal order, and at least of the 
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plurality of opinion development processes and preserves stability of states and ensures incremental 
improvements at institution-based platforms. 
 Hybridity has a significant effect on the consciousness level of foundationalism, cooperationalism, 
institutionalism, social responsibility and philanthropic actions. 
According to the mode of institutionalization, there are three types of governance; ‘governance by 
governments’, ‘governance with governments’ and ‘governance without governments’.18 
 
Table 3. Governance by/with/without Government(s) 
 
Type of Governance 
Mode of 
Institutionalization 
Norm Building 
Norm 
Implementing 
Governance by 
government(s) 
International/governmenta
l cooperation 
Without self-organization Via nation-states 
Governance with 
government(s) 
Global policy networks With self-organization With nation-states 
Governance without 
government(s) 
Transnational network 
organizations 
Via self-organization 
Without nation-
states 
 
Source: Mückenberger 2008: 27 
 
Table 3 illustrates the types of governance with comparing modes of institutionalization and how norms are 
built and implemented. At the level of governance by governments, states are presented by their own 
governments. The governments of states can create international global relations with other sovereign states 
or international organizations. This type of governance doesn’t let non-state actors to build norms and it exists 
only at nation-state level. Classical nation-state model exists and norms are built without self-organization. 
Governance with governments means among others also governments take place; however there are also 
non-state actors. Equal participation of state actors and non-state actors creates hybrid structures in which 
these actors come together to deal with common issues and gain common objectives. Hybrid model is typically 
related to governance with governments because public actors, private actors and civil society actors share 
common interests and these interests are quite important in terms of reciprocal understanding. For state actors 
hybrid model means centralized authority of state that has an influence on private sector and civil society. For 
private actors hybrid model means creation of new markets and capacity building. For civil society hybrid 
model means having a mainstream role among state and private and transform interests in favor of the 
goodness of society. 
The challenge is that non-state actors or sovereignty-free actors influence deeply the inter-state system’s 
monopoly of authority. Some commentators assessed a power shift from state to non-state actors, as 
sovereignty-free actors link up and operate across state borders as part of transnational networks. We can 
assume that the current transformation of governance for political concepts such as central authority, 
sovereignty, decentralization and democratic legitimacy is to balance the tendency toward theoretical 
complexity with the need for simplicity to avoid replicating the multidimensional and multicausal nature of 
current world politics. In the light of these considerations, hybrid model in migration research is a transition for 
social transformation and indirect centralization. As an illustration, migration and asylum issues acquire 
elements of multi-level governance and a theoretical dispersal of power away from the nation-state with the 
assigning policy-making capacity to Brussels. On the one hand, this gives to Brussels a central authority, on 
the other hand, this shift of power causes decentralization in nation state structure. Central power of Brussels’ 
governance ought to be effectively enhanced by legally binding verdicts to take illegal migrants and asylum 
seekers under the control of the EU institutions. Collaboration with post-communist institutions in Western 
Balkan states will enhance democracy level, rule of law and the prosperity for civil society. 
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Appendix I. Total Visa statistics 2009 
Schengen States Schengen visas 
(Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas) 
Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued Number of visas issued Non issuance rate 
AT 285.196 5,23% 27.169 
BE 165.474 17,38% 24.588 
CH 351.578 8,70% 37.975 
CZ 440.360 3,74% 17.109 
DE 1.491.784 9,06% 139.640 
DK 77.142 5,40% 1.037 
EE 93.464 2,49% 399 
EL 598.883 4,68% 40.686 
ES 748.466 9,97% 135.568 
FI 783.340 1,58% - 
FR 1.415.886 12,35% 167.108 
HU 272.972 4,14% 8.530 
IS 779 4,18% 88 
IT 1.053.354 5,02% 155.286 
LT 236.299 1,77% 2.824 
LU 5.364 2,38% 27 
LV 118.436 3,48% 1.450 
MT 28.915 9,31% 4.168 
NL 313.534 7,37% 9.032 
NO 105.430 0,75% 16.502 
PL 579.424 3,29% 210.292 
PT 107.224 6,87% 15.800 
SE 172.595 7,62% 527 
SI 97.690 4,19% 391 
SK 62.287 3,78% 1.982 
UE Member States not 
applying yet fully the 
Schengen acquis 
Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued 
Number of visas issued Non issuance rate 
BG 595.914 1,05% 8.575 
CY 113.205 2,63% - 
RO 175.956 3,24% 12.831 
Totals 
Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued 
Number of visas issued Non issuance rate 
Sub-total Schengen 9.605.876 7,11% 1.018.178 
Sub-total non Schengen 885.075 1,70% 21.406 
Total 10.490.951 6,68% 1.039.584 
Source: European Commission 2011: 21 
Appendix II. Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data and 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US$) According to World Bank Data 
 
Albania            
Indicator Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
17.45868           
Net migration -270245     -72243     -47889 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum 
523 292 17 26 51 56 56 77 65 70 76 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of origin 
6802 7626 10761 10385 10478 12722 14079 15340 15006 15711 14772 
International migrant stock, 
total 
76695     82668     89106 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
2.496699     2.631231     2.780839651 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual 
countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 89106 
Host Country: 1438451 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Greece, Italy, Germany, the UK and France 1438.3 thousands, 45.4% 
of total population (2.83 
million, Instat 2011) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 53.1% 89.1 thousands, 2.8% of 
total population 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
20.30026           
Net migration 281795     61825     -10000 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum 
38152 32745 28022 22517 22215 10568 10318 7367 7257 7132 7016 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of origin 
474981 447321 406326 300006 228815 109930 199946 78273 74366 70018 63004 
International migrant stock, 
total 
96001     35141     27780 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
2.599048     0.92941     0.73880051 
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Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual 
countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 27780 
Host Country: 1460639 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and Italy 1461.0 thousands, 
38.9% of total population 
(3.8 million, 2011) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 50.3% 27.8 thousands, 0.7% of 
total population 
Kosovo** **World Bank migration data are not available for the Republic of Kosovo. However, total number of bilateral migrant stocks for 
host country is; 25251 and top destination countries are; Germany, Italy, Austria and the UK. According to UNDP Kosovo 
Remittance Study 2010 the total amount of remittances received in 2009 was €442.7 million, 11% of the overall GDP in year 
2009. 
Macedonia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
29.38359           
Net migration -9000     -4000     2000 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum 
9050 4363 2816 193 1004 1274 1240 1235 1672 1542 1398 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of origin 
2176 12197 8072 5982 5104 8600 7940 8077 7521 7926 7889 
International migrant stock, 
total 
125665     120288     129701 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
6.254819     5.901941     6.294444771 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual 
countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 129701  
Host Country: 447137  
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Italy, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and France 447.1 thousand, 21.9% of 
total population (2 
million, 2010) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 58.3% 129.7 thousands, 6.3% of 
total population 
Montenegro 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
           
Net migration -32450     -20632     -2508 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum 
      6926 8528 24741 24019 16364 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of origin 
      135 557 1283 2582 3246 
International migrant stock, 
total 
     54583     42509 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
     8.709048     6.731539692 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual 
countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 42509 
Host Country: 36 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Denmark and Hungary 0.0 thousands 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 61.5% 42.5 thousands, 6.8% of 
total population (0.63 
million, 2010) 
Serbia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
           
Net migration -147889     -338544     0 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum 
484391 400304 354402 291403 276683 148264 98997 97995 96739 86351 73608 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of origin 
146748 144231 323335 296632 237032 189989 174027 165643 185935 195626 183289 
International migrant stock, 
total 
856763     674612     525388 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
11.39866     9.066428     7.204424665 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual 
countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 525388  
Host Country: 130844  
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Austria, France and Denmark 196.0 thousands, 2.0% of 
total population (7.3 
million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 56.7% 525.4 thousands, 5.3% of 
total population 
Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US$) 
Albania 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 598 699 734 889 1161 1290 1359 1468 1495 1317 1285 
Workers' remittances 531 615 643 778 1028 1161 1176 1305 1226 1090  
Compensation of employees 67 84 90 111 132 129 184 163 270 227  
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Migrants' transfer            
Outward remittance flows    4 5 7 27 10 16 10  
Workers' remittances    0 0  0     
Compensation of employees    4 5 7 27 10 16 9  
Migrants' transfer            
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$0.9 bn, net ODA received US$0.4 bn, total international reserves US$2.4 bn, exports of goods and services US$3.8 
bn in 2008. 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 1595 1521 1526 1749 2072 2043 2157 2700 2735 2167 2228 
Workers' remittances 950 919 956 1143 1474 1467 1589 1947 1899 1432  
Compensation of employees 631 581 540 595 579 570 560 739 828 643  
Migrants' transfer 26 25 30 11 19 5 8 13 8 6  
Outward remittance flows 2 11 14 20 62 40 55 65 70 61  
Workers' remittances  5 7 10 49 28 41 50 53 46  
Compensation of employees 2 6 7 11 13 12 14 15 17 15  
Migrants' transfer            
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$1.1 bn, net ODA received US$0.5 bn, total international reserves US$3.5 bn, exports of goods and services US$6.8 
bn in 2008. 
Kosovo** Remittance data are currently not available for Kosovo.  
Macedonia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 81 73 106 174 213 227 267 345 407 401 414 
Workers' remittances 80 68 92 146 161 169 198 239 266 260  
Compensation of employees 0 5 14 28 52 57 69 106 140 121  
Migrants' transfer            
Outward remittance flows 14 21 23 16 16 16 18 25 33 26  
Workers' remittances 14 21 23 15 15 14 16 22 28 22  
Compensation of employees   1 1 1 2 2 3 5 4  
Migrants' transfer            
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$0.6 bn, net ODA received US$0.2 bn, total international reserves US$2.1 bn, exports of goods and services US$5.0 
bn in 2008. 
Montenegro Remittance data are currently not available for Montenegro.  
Serbia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 1132* 1698* 2089* 2661 4129 4650 4703 5377 5538 5406 558 
Workers' remittances        2948 2913 3755  
Compensation of employees        148 191 184  
Migrants' transfer        2 2 3  
Outward remittance flows        114 138 91  
Workers' remittances        95 114 70  
Compensation of employees        17 23 20  
Migrants' transfer        2 1 1  
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$3.0 bn, net ODA received US$1.0 bn, total international reserves US$11.5 bn, exports of goods and services 
US$14.8 bn in 2008. 
*Serbia and Montenegro 
Source: The World Bank 2008; The World Bank 2011 
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Appendix III. Comparison of the European Union Pre-accession Assistance for the Western Balkan Countries 
 
Albania 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 56.52 38.66 15% 
Public Administration Reform 43.15 38.66 15% 
Transport 49.06 51.55 20% 
Environment and Climate Change 80.12 51.55 20% 
Social Development 13.40 25.77 10% 
Rural Development/Agriculture 17.20 51.55 20% 
TOTAL 259.45 257.74 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 84.30 85.99 87.45 
Cross-border Cooperation 10.13 10.28 10.67 
TOTAL 94.43 96.27 98.12 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 38.64 55.00 17.5 % 
Public Administration Reform 51.55 40.00 12.7 % 
Private Sector Development 28.10 50.00 15.9 % 
Transport 22.30 35.00 11.1 % 
Environment and Climate Change 72.70 54.22 17.3 % 
Social Development 46.75 40.00 12.7 % 
Acquis related and other Actions 52.54 40.00 12.7 % 
TOTAL 312.58 314.22 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 102.68 104.67 106.87 
Cross-border Cooperation 4.75 4.80 4.94 
TOTAL 107.43 109.47 111.81 
Kosovo 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 78.50 (18.46%) 61.09 30 % 
Private Sector Development 192.93 (45.38 %) 97.75 48 % 
Public Administration Reform 106.22 (24.98%) 20.35 10 % 
Other 47.55 (11.18%) 24.42 12 % 
TOTAL 425.20 203.61 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 65.83 67.07 70.71 
Cross-border Cooperation 2.87 2.93 2.99 
TOTAL 68.70 70.00 73.70 
Macedonia 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Public Administration Reform 28.00 21.33 7 % 
Justice, Home Affairs and Fundamental 
Rights 
44.00 24.38 8 % 
Private Sector Development 45.50 45.71 15% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 46.40 67.04 22 % 
Transport 52.50 60.95 20% 
Environment and Climate Change 28.30 54.85 18% 
Social Development 37.30 30.47 10% 
TOTAL 282.00 304.76 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 28.80 28.20 27.94 
Cross-border Cooperation 5.12 5.18 5.24 
Regional Development 39.30 42.30 51.80 
Human Resources Development 8.80 10.38 11.20 
Rural Development 16.00 19.00 21.03 
TOTAL 98.02 105.07 117.21 
Montenegro 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 17.85 7.30 8% 
Public Administration 21.65 10.04 11% 
Environment and Climate Change 14.80 22.82 25% 
Transport 16.20 18.26 20% 
Social development 8.63 9.13 10% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 8.10 14.60 16% 
Ad hoc measures 8.11 9.13 10% 
TOTAL 106.54 91.28 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 29843599 21585429 49.05% 
Cross-border Cooperation 4310344 9257238 12.94% 
Regional Development 0 23200000 22.13% 
Social Development 0 5757077 5.49% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 0 10900000 10.40% 
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TOTAL 34153943 70699744 100.00% 
Serbia 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 42.00 75.00 12% 
Public Administration Reform 89.00 75.00 12% 
Social Development 96.00 75.00 12% 
Private Sector Development 34.00 75.00 12% 
Transport 71.00 75.00 12% 
Environment, Climate Change and Energy 93.00 99.00 16% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 34.00 75.00 12% 
Other EU Acquis and Horizontal Activities 120.00 75.00 12% 
TOTAL 579.00 624.00 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 190.00 194.00 203.00 
Cross-border Cooperation 12.00 12.00 12.00 
TOTAL 202.00 206.00 215.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix IV. Output of SPSS Data Analyses (Democracy and Institutions) 
1. General variables 
Country:    country name 
Countryn:   country code: Albania 1; Bosnia and Herzegovina 2; Kosovo 3; Macedonia (FYR) 4; Montenegro 5; Serbia 6. 
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 52 86,7 
  Excluded(a) 8 13,3 
  Total 60 100,0 
a  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items 
N of Items 
,922 ,947 4 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,819 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 315,262 
  df 10 
  Sig. ,000 
Item Statistics Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
N 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World" 3,5769 1,07277 52 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral 
Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance 
3,9660 ,56013 52 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption 
4,6996 ,56573 52 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World" 3,1923 ,88647 52 
 35 
 
  
Summary Item Statistics 
  Mean Minimum Maximum Range 
Maximum / 
Minimum 
Variance N of Items 
Item Means 3,859 3,192 4,700 1,507 1,472 ,414 4 
Item Variances ,643 ,314 1,151 ,837 3,668 ,164 4 
Inter-Item Covariances ,480 ,246 ,848 ,601 3,440 ,038 4 
Inter-Item Correlations ,816 ,749 ,896 ,147 1,196 ,004 4 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
15,4348 8,327 2,88567 4 
 
ANOVA with Friedman's Test 
  Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square Friedman's 
Chi-Square 
Sig 
Between People 106,171 51 2,082     
Within People Between Items 64,590(a) 3 21,530 112,567 ,000 
Residual 24,922 153 ,163     
Total 89,512 156 ,574     
Total 195,683 207 ,945     
Grand Mean = 3,8587 
a  Kendall's coefficient of concordance W = ,330. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hotelling's T-Squared Test 
Hotelling's T-
Squared 
F df1 df2 Sig 
415,862 133,185 3 49 ,000 
 
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 
  
Intraclass 
Correlation(a) 
95% Confidence Interval F Test with True Value 0 
  Lower Bound Upper Bound Value df1 df2 Sig Lower Bound 
Single Measures ,747(b) ,647 ,831 12,780 51,0 153 ,000 
Average Measures ,922(c) ,880 ,951 12,780 51,0 153 ,000 
Two-way mixed effects model where people effects are random and measures effects are fixed. 
a  Type C intraclass correlation coefficients using a consistency definition-the between-measure variance is excluded from the denominator variance. 
b  The estimator is the same, whether the interaction effect is present or not. 
c  This estimate is computed assuming the interaction effect is absent, because it is not estimable otherwise. 
 
Correlations 
  rating of Political 
Rights as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
rating of Civil 
Liberties as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
Nations in Transit - 
Democratization score 
is calculated as the 
average of scores 
obtained on 4 
dimensions: Electoral 
Process, Civil Society, 
Independent Media 
and Governance 
Nations in Transit - Rule of 
Law score is calculated as 
the average of ratings 
obtained on two 
dimensions: Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial 
Framework and Corruption 
rating of Political Rights as calculated 
by Freedom House and reported 
annually in the publication "Freedom 
in the World" 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 ,927(**) ,911(**) ,830(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed)   ,000 ,000 ,000 
  N 112 112 70 70 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated 
by Freedom House and reported 
annually in the publication "Freedom 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,927(**) 1 ,848(**) ,788(**) 
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in the World" 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000   ,000 ,000 
  N 112 112 70 70 
Nations in Transit - Democratization 
score is calculated as the average of 
scores obtained on 4 dimensions: 
Electoral Process, Civil Society, 
Independent Media and Governance 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,911(**) ,848(**) 1 ,913(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000   ,000 
  N 70 70 78 78 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score 
is calculated as the average of 
ratings obtained on two dimensions: 
Constitutional, Legislative and 
Judicial Framework and Corruption 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,830(**) ,788(**) ,913(**) 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000   
  N 70 70 78 78 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Each country and territory is awarded from 0 to 4 raw points for each of 10 questions grouped into three subcategories in a political rights checklist (A. Electoral Process, 
B. Political Pluralism and Participation and C. Functioning of Government) and for each of 15 questions grouped into four subcategories in a civil liberties checklist (A. 
Freedom of Expression and Belief, B. Associational and Organizational Rights, C. Rule of Law and D. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights). A country or territory is 
assigned a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 7 based on the total number of raw points awarded to the political rights and civil liberties checklist questions. For both 
checklists, 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free; each 1 to 7 rating corresponds to a range of total raw scores. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties 
ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” Those whose ratings average 1-2.5 are considered Free, 3-5.5 Partly Free, and 
5.5-7 Not Free. The dividing line between Partly Free and Not Free falls at 5.5. For example, countries that receive a rating of 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, 
or a 5 for political rights and a 6 for civil liberties, could be either Partly Free or Not Free. The total number of raw points is the definitive factor that determines the final 
status. Countries and territories with combined raw scores of 0-33 points are Not Free, 34-67 points are Partly Free, and 68-100 are Free. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Item Statistics 
 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
bicameral or unicameral 
parliament, as defined in the 
country's constitution. 
,69 1,423 484 
form of state organization as 
defined by constitution -,36 ,823 484 
electoral system for the (lower 
chamber of the) Parliament 
1,00 1,859 484 
index of rigidity of constitution 1,86 2,016 484 
 
ANOVA 
  
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig 
Between People 3772,988 483 7,812     
Within People 
Between Items 1222,228 3 407,409 506,961 ,000 
Residual 1164,460 1449 ,804     
Total 2386,687 1452 1,644     
Total 6159,675 1935 3,183     
Grand Mean = ,80 
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Correlations 
    
bicameral or 
unicameral 
parliament, as 
defined in the 
country's 
constitution. 
form of state 
organization as 
defined by 
constitution 
electoral system 
for the (lower 
chamber of the) 
Parliament 
index of rigidity of 
constitution  
bicameral or unicameral 
parliament, as defined in the 
country's constitution. 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,925(**) ,657(**) ,844(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)   ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 486 486 484 486 
form of state organization as 
defined by constitution 
Pearson Correlation ,925(**) 1 ,703(**) ,891(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000   ,000 ,000 
N 486 502 484 486 
electoral system for the (lower 
chamber of the) Parliament  
Pearson Correlation ,657(**) ,703(**) 1 ,724(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000   ,000 
N 484 484 484 484 
index of rigidity of constitution 
Pearson Correlation ,844(**) ,891(**) ,724(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000   
N 486 486 484 486 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
  rating of 
Political Rights 
as calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
Nations in Transit - 
Democratization 
score is calculated 
as the average of 
scores obtained on 
4 dimensions: 
Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, 
Independent Media 
and Governance 
Nations in Transit - Rule 
of Law score is 
calculated as the 
average of ratings 
obtained on two 
dimensions: 
Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial 
Framework and 
Corruption 
rating of Civil 
Liberties as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World"  
rating of Political Rights as calculated by 
Freedom House and reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the World" 
1,000 ,896 ,770 ,891 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is 
calculated as the average of scores obtained 
on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil 
Society, Independent Media and Governance 
,896 1,000 ,778 ,811 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is 
calculated as the average of ratings obtained 
on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative 
and Judicial Framework and Corruption 
,770 ,778 1,000 ,749 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by 
Freedom House and reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the World" 
,891 ,811 ,749 1,000 
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Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
  rating of 
Political Rights 
as calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
Nations in Transit - 
Democratization 
score is calculated 
as the average of 
scores obtained on 
4 dimensions: 
Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, 
Independent Media 
and Governance 
Nations in Transit - Rule 
of Law score is 
calculated as the 
average of ratings 
obtained on two 
dimensions: 
Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial 
Framework and 
Corruption 
rating of Civil 
Liberties as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by 
Freedom House and reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the World" 
1,151 ,538 ,467 ,848 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is 
calculated as the average of scores obtained 
on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil 
Society, Independent Media and Governance 
,538 ,314 ,246 ,403 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is 
calculated as the average of ratings obtained 
on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative 
and Judicial Framework and Corruption 
,467 ,246 ,320 ,376 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by 
Freedom House and reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the World" 
,848 ,403 ,376 ,786 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communalities 
  Initial Extraction 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World" 1,000 ,925 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World" 1,000 ,871 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption 
1,000 ,870 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral 
Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance 
1,000 ,942 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3,609 90,215 90,215 3,609 90,215 90,215 
2 ,251 6,279 96,494       
3 ,093 2,313 98,807       
4 ,048 1,193 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Component Matrix(a) 
  Component 
  1 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World" ,962 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World" ,933 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and 
Judicial Framework and Corruption 
,933 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil 
Society, Independent Media and Governance 
,971 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  1 components extracted. 
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Reproduced Correlations 
    
rating of Political 
Rights as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
rating of Civil 
Liberties as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
Nations in Transit - 
Rule of Law score is 
calculated as the 
average of ratings 
obtained on two 
dimensions: 
Constitutional, 
Legislative and 
Judicial Framework 
and Corruption 
Nations in Transit - 
Democratization 
score is calculated 
as the average of 
scores obtained on 4 
dimensions: 
Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, 
Independent Media 
and Governance 
Reproduced 
Correlation 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and 
reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World" 
,925(b) ,898 ,897 ,934 
  
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and 
reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World" 
,898 ,871(b) ,871 ,906 
  
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average 
of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative 
and Judicial Framework and Corruption 
,897 ,871 ,870(b) ,905 
  
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the 
average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance 
,934 ,906 ,905 ,942(b) 
Residual(a) 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and 
reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World" 
  ,013 -,067 -,023 
  
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and 
reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World" 
,013   -,083 -,058 
  
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average 
of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative 
and Judicial Framework and Corruption 
-,067 -,083   ,021 
  
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the 
average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance 
-,023 -,058 ,021   
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Residuals are computed between observed and reproduced correlations. There are 3 (50,0%) nonredundant residuals with absolute values greater than 0.05. 
b  Reproduced communalities 
Rotated Component Matrix(a) 
a  Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated. 
 
 
 
1. Institutions 
 
bicam  bicameral or unicameral parliament, as defined in the country’s constitution.  
codes: 1 - unicameral parliament; 2 - bicameral parliament; -2 – communist constitution 
subordup subordinated upper chamber: relationship between the lower and upper chamber, as framed by the post-communist constitutions.  
codes: 1 – upper chamber is subordinated; 0 - upper chamber is not subordinated; -1 – unicameral parliament; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule 
electup  mode of election of upper chamber 
1 codes: 1 – appointment/delegation; 2 – indirect by regional/state legislature; 3 – directly by the people; 4 – other; -1 – unicameral Parliament; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule 
2 federal  form of state organization as defined by constitution 
 codes: 1 – federal state; 0 – other; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule 
judrev judicial review – existence of an independent body which decides whether laws are in conformity with the constitution 
3 codes: 1 – yes ; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule 
electsys electoral system for the (lower chamber of the) Parliament 
4 codes: 0 – proportional representation; 1 – proportional representation modified; 2 – majoritarian; 3 – parallel (the chamber is elected using both majoritarian and proportional representation systems, and each is 
allocated a   fixed number of seats); -2 – communist election rule 
cab_type type of cabinet  
 codes: 1 - single party majority; 2 - minimal winning; 3 - surplus coalition; 4 - single party minority; 5 - minority coalition; 6 -caretaker; 7 - grand coalition 
n/p – non-party ministers or experts; na – presidential cabinets (cabinets at the formation of which the Parliament composition is not taken into account) 
Irid index of rigidity of constitution 
 codes: 1- ordinary majorities; 2 – more than ordinary but less than two-thirds majorities plus referendum; 3 - two-thirds majorities and equivalent; 4 - supermajorities (greater than two-thirds). If particularly difficult 
conditions for amending the constitution existed, an intermediary category was created by adding .5 to the code describing the basic conditions. 
Req_rev required referendum 
  codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other 
Vp_ref veto point referendum 
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other 
Pop_veto popular veto 
 codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other 
Pop_init popular initiative 
 codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other  
Topics of referenda:  
refers to the issues on which referenda are required or can be organized 
based on post-communist constitutions 
Topic 1 border issues and association/secession issues; delegation of state powers to international organizations 
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no;  -2 – communist constitution 
 
 
Topic2 adoption of and amendments to constitution; adoption of and change in other laws 
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no;  -2 – communist constitution 
Topic3 dissolution of Parliament; impeachment 
 codes: 1- yes; 0 – no;  -2 – communist constitution 
Topic4 other issues "of national importance" 
 codes: 1- yes; 0 – no;  -2 – communist constitution 
polsys political system 
 codes: 0 – parliamentary; 1 – presidential; 2 – semi-presidential, dominated by president; 3 – semi-presidential, dominated by parliament; 4 – other 
ppi  presidential power index 
 -2 - communist constitutions 
 
 
 45 
 
2. Democracy 
 
independ year of acquisition of independence (for NIS) or official end of communist rule (for CEE) 
 codes: 0 – communist rule; 1 - independent or non-communist 
FH overall status of a country 
 codes: 0 – not free; 1 - partly free; 2 – free;  
“.” missing value – data does not exist 
FH_PR rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication “Freedom in the World”  
FH_CL rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication “Freedom in the World”  
NiT_DEM Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance (1 highest, 7 lowest)  
NiT_ROL Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_EC Nations in Transit - Economic Liberalization score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on three dimensions: Privatization, Macroeconomic Policy and Microeconomic Policy (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_DEM2 Nations in Transit - Democracy score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 7 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media, National Democratic Governance, Local Democratic 
Governance, Judicial Framework and Independence and Corruption (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_EP Nations in Transit – Electoral process score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_CS Nations in Transit – Civil society score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_Media Nations in Transit – Independent media score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_GOV Nations in Transit – Governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_NGov Nations in Transit – National democratic governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest); was introduced in 2005 edition (inputed as of 2004) 
NiT_LGov Nations in Transit – Local democratic governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest); was introduced in 2005 edition (inputed as of 2004) 
NiT_JUD Nations in Transit – Judicial Framework and Independence score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_COR Nations in Transit – Corruption score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
freedom1 rating of press freedom  
codes: 0 - not free; 1 - partly free; 2 - free; 
   “.” missing value – data does not exist 
freedom2 rating of press freedom scores. Data is available only from 1994 onward. 
“.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist 
CPI Corruption Perception Index. CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
codes: table entries are CPI values.  
“.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist 
source: Transparency International. 
war violent conflict inside the country or at the borders. 
  codes: 0 – no violent conflict; 1 – war, civil war or turmoil; 2 – ceasefire 
   “.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist 
 
 
